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Abstract: This paper provides evidence of racial variation in traffic enforcement
responses to local government budget stress using data from policing agencies in
the state of Missouri from 2001 through 2012. Like previous studies, we find that
local budget stress is associated with higher citation rates; we also find an increase
in traffic-stop arrest rates. However, we find that these effects are concentrated
among White (rather than Black or Latino) drivers. The results are robust to
the inclusion of a range of covariates and a variety of model specifications,
including a regression discontinuity examining bare budget shortfalls.
Considering potential mechanisms, we find that targeting of White drivers is
higher where the White-to-Black income ratio is higher, consistent with the targeting of drivers who are better able to pay fines. Further, the relative effect on
White drivers is higher in areas with statistical over-policing of Black drivers:
when Black drivers are already getting too many fines, police cite White
drivers from whom they are presumably more likely to be able to raise the
needed extra revenue. These results highlight the relationship between
policing-as-taxation and racial inequality in policing outcomes.
Keywords: policing, traffic stops, discrimination, budgets, local budgets,
budgetary, shortfalls, racial discrimination.
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INTRODUCTION
New models of policing combining aggressive tactics with data-driven
management metrics have created tensions between the residents of lowincome communities—often home to members of racial and ethnic
minority groups—and the police (Heymann 2000; Tyler and Fagan
2008), with little evidence of substantial public safety gains
(MacDonald, Fagan, and Geller 2016). In this article, we examine how
institutional changes can affect racially targeted policing, where historically traffic and misdemeanor enforcement has been concentrated
among drivers and residents in communities subjugated by race and
class (Soss and Weaver 2017). Our goal is to provide evidence on how
the institutional priorities of law enforcement agencies influence racial
disparities in policing activities, which could potentially lead to the reproduction of disadvantage among heavily policed populations.
A large literature has documented that traffic police disproportionately
target Black and Latino drivers when making stops (Pierson et al. 2017).
At the micro level of individual traffic stops, scholars have formalized conditions for measuring discrimination, and econometricians and political
scientists have identified it in traffic stop data (e.g. Grogger and
Ridgeway 2006; Knowles, Persico, and Todd 2001; Rojek, Rosenfeld,
and Decker 2004; Soss and Weaver 2017). At the macro level, the consequences of this discrimination have been observed in entire criminal
justice systems, entire communities, and entire states (Baumgartner,
Epp, and Shoub 2018; Fagan and Ash 2017; Shoub et al. 2020). More
specifically, for example, Shoub et al. (2020) analyze a unique dataset covering multiple municipalities and control for a variety of stop-related and
contextual factors to find that driver race remains an important predictor
for whether a driver is searched. In this paper, we ask how shifting institutional motivations—that appear, on the surface, to be race-neutral—
influence racial discrimination in traffic stops.1
A baseline motivation for policing is the desire to establish “social
control” within poor communities of color (Soss and Weaver 2017).
The advent of “law and order” policing in the 1960s and successive
Wars on Crime continue to influence modern-day policing (Council
2004; Hinton 2016; Soss and Weaver 2017; Wilson and Kelling 1982).
Officers motivated to quell urban “disorder” are more likely to police residents in poorer communities of color, contributing to racially disparate
outcomes in traffic stop and street encounters.
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However, another line of research has examined the public-finance
motivations underlying aggressive policing. It is well-documented that
local governments rely on revenue from traffic tickets, and officials often
look to this source of revenue to help overcome budget shortfalls (DOJ
2015). In fact, some jurisdictions structure revenues that they anticipate
from fines, fees, and seizures into agency budgets (Baicker and Jacobson
2007). Other jurisdictions pursue these revenue-generating activities not
only to provide municipal services, but to sustain their own police
forces. For example, the recent Ferguson Report issued by the U.S.
Department of Justice suggests that the municipality tried to cloak its
taxing power in the exercise of police power by functionally equating
the power of taxation with the power to punish (DOJ 2015). The report
noted that local police in Ferguson and nearby communities had grown
to depend on these revenue streams to sustain the size of the police
force and to pay salaries and annual increases to the officers. Significant
racial differences in traffic stops persist 5 years after the protests in
Ferguson (and 4 years after the DOJ Report),2 illustrating how deeply
embedded these practices are in the political and institutional culture.
In this paper, we explore, empirically, the intersection of race, policing,
and this use of fees and fines as a form of latent taxation. We hope to shed
light on how law enforcement’s fiscal pressures interact with its treatment
of members of different racial groups, often leading to a set of monetary
burdens on those most closely surveilled and least likely to have the financial resources to shoulder those burdens. We use data from the state of MO
to assess whether police officers’ ticketing behaviors are discriminatory,
whether the disparity in ticketing changes when a municipality is faced
with governmental pressures to increase ticketing revenue, and what
these changes may suggest about law enforcement’s preferences when it
comes to race and punishment.
To provide empirical evidence on these issues, we construct a dataset
on local fiscal stress for 196 local policing agencies in MO from 2001
to 2012. When local governments experience negative budgetary shocks
(shortfalls), police may be given incentives to increase traffic enforcement
to generate revenue (Garrett and Wagner 2009), or to shift resources to
enforcement activities more likely to generate revenue. We use traffic
enforcement and arrest data to assess the effects of fiscal pressure. Our
innovation from the previous literature on the relationship between
fiscal distress and policing is that we consider effects across different
groups of drivers.
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Consistent with research on social control, discrimination, and
policing, we find that traffic police in MO stop Black and Latino drivers
more frequently than White drivers, as a share of the local population.
However, we find that in times of budget stress, local police and sheriffs
increase their targeting of White drivers. Holding the number of traffic
stops constant, the citation rate and arrest rate for White drivers increase.
There is no effect on citations and arrests of non-White drivers. The
finding is robust to a number of alternative specifications and checks,
and it does not appear to be driven by confounding trends. The result
holds in a regression-discontinuity (RD) framework where, if a locality
barely has a revenue shortfall, there is an increase in citation rates for
White drivers but not for Black and Latino drivers.
These results may reflect a different set of institutional pressures regarding law enforcement and race than those that produce or increase racial
discrimination, such as baseline commitments to social control or pressures related to the electoral cycle (Kubik and Moran 2003; Park 2017;
Soss and Weaver 2017). Instead, the results are consistent with a model
where traffic police selectively target presumably higher-income drivers
to compensate for budget stress. Rather than being responsive to traditional
discriminatory pressures—whether they arise from taste-based preferences,
statistical discrimination, or institutional priorities—officers’ increased citation and arrest rates of White drivers may be indicative of a shift toward
targeting motorists where there is more scope for increased revenues.
We explore two key reasons for a White–Black difference in expected
profitability. First, White drivers may have higher incomes than Black
drivers and therefore be more likely to be able to pay fines. To probe
this possibility, we examine whether our estimates depend on the ratio
of incomes of White residents to Black residents in the local community.
Indeed, we find that the targeting of White drivers in citation and arrest
rates is most prevalent where the White-to-Black income ratio is highest.
Therefore, the evidence supports relative income across drivers as a significant factor in revenue-generating policing decisions, specifically during
times of municipal fiscal distress.
A second potential explanation is that targeting of White drivers is a side
effect of pre-existing over-policing in Black communities. That is, Black
drivers may already be getting stopped and cited as much as possible, so
stopping an additional Black driver is unlikely to produce a revenuegenerating ticket (because there are not enough additional Black drivers
committing citable traffic violations, or who are willing or able to pay).
We find evidence consistent with this mechanism: targeting White
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drivers under fiscal pressure is highest in areas with the highest Black stop
intensity (stops of Black drivers per Black resident). In other words, our
findings suggest that when pressed to find new revenue streams to selffinance policing, discriminatory policing shifts from the usual targets of
social control (Black drivers with relatively limited economic resources)
to relatively high-income White drivers (normally the lowest-priority
targets for social control through policing).

BACKGROUND
Racial disparities in traffic stops and citations are widespread in MO
(Hernández-Murillo and Knowles 2004; Missouri 2019; Rojek,
Rosenfeld, and Decker 2004; Rosenfeld, Rojek, and Decker 2011) and
elsewhere (Baumgartner, Epp, and Shoub 2018; Epp, Maynard-Moody,
and Haider-Markel 2014; Harris 1999; Pierson et al. 2017). Earlier
research on discriminatory enforcement in highway searches suggested
two alternative explanations. Either police were stopping people of color
more often because they were more likely to have drugs or contraband
(what economists refer to as statistical discrimination), or police were stopping these motorists more often because of their preferences for stopping
people of color (what economists refer to as taste-based discrimination)
(Gross and Barnes 2002; Knowles, Persico, and Todd 2001; Persico and
Todd 2006). In practice, it can be difficult to identify whether or not individual officers, who are constrained actors in large and complex governmental institutions, have a “taste” for discrimination. However, research
has also shown that even though they are searched and stopped at
higher rates than Whites, stops of Black and Latino drivers are often less
likely to result in the discovery of contraband (Goel et al. 2017;
Stanford Open Policing Project 2019). Such findings mirror those from
analyses of stop-and-frisk and similar policies, where Blacks and those in
poor neighborhoods are stopped and frisked more frequently than
Whites, but less likely to be found in possession of contraband, suggesting
discrimination based on perceived racial identity (Fagan et al. 2009;
Harcourt 2008; Soss and Weaver 2017).
Racial discrimination in traffic stops is consistent with a police force
motivated by a desire to establish “social control” (Soss and Weaver
2017) within poor communities of color. The advent of “law and
order” policing in the 1960s and the Wars on Crime and Drugs has
had long-lasting effects (Harmon 2012; Hinton 2016; Soss and Weaver
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2017; Wilson and Kelling 1982). The models of policing that have
emerged since then and through the 2000s continue to share a commitment to “the elimination of disorder and the regulatory enforcement of
codes against disordered people and places” (Soss and Weaver 2017,
570) and have contributed to community views of the police as an oppressive institution (Weaver, Prowse, and Piston 2020). As long as such “disorder” is associated with poor communities of color, we should
continue to expect to observe racially disparate policing outcomes, including those stemming from traffic stops.
The interactions between racial discrimination in policing and the pressure on officers to maximize revenue are complex. Monetary penalties
have proven to be quite popular in state legislatures and in criminal
legal institutions. Fines are seen both as a legitimate deterrent to wrongdoing and a means of transferring the costs of criminal justice administration (courts, police, prisons, etc.) to those accused of breaking the law,
costs that would otherwise fall on ostensibly law-abiding taxpayers. In addition, unlike prison, fines do not keep the defendant out of the workforce.
However, these fines and related fees (including late payment fees and
court fees) can act as a latent tax on poor people (Bannon, Nagrecha,
and Diller 2010; CEA 2015; Harris 2017). Traffic stops can provide a politically expedient mechanism to generate revenue since the related fines
and fees allow state and local legislators to get around tough rules limiting
local tax increases. Fines and administrative fees offer the executive a path
to budgetary relief with limited legislative involvement or court oversight,
allowing for de facto taxation by administrative rulemaking.
Recent studies, such as the DOJ Ferguson Report (DOJ 2015), provide
evidence of this instrumental motivation for police to pursue traffic stops:
maximizing revenue to police agencies to sustain or expand police
budgets. The Ferguson Report (2015) also illustrates how this revenuegenerating regime disproportionately penetrates communities with high
proportions of people of color. Disparate treatment at each stage of processing skews the criminal justice “tax” toward Blacks and Latinos, whose economic position often is more tenuous than that of their White
counterparts (Parker, Lane, and Alpert 2010). The case of Ferguson is
part of the broader geography of racial targeting in aggressive policing
(Fagan and Ash 2017; Geller et al. 2014).
Police departments are often encouraged to maintain revenues from
fines and fees at the expected level, and local executives have even
reminded police departments that these revenues directly affect officers’
pay. For example, in the Appendix, we include an infamous memo by

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Columbia University - Law Library, on 26 Aug 2020 at 22:16:07, subject to the Cambridge
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/rep.2020.10

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3192562

Fiscal Pressures and Discriminatory Policing

7

Mayor John Gwaltney of Edmundson, MO, encouraging the local police
department to write more tickets. In the letter, the mayor reminds the
police department that “the tickets [officers] write do add to the
revenue on which the [ police department] budget is established and
will directly affect pay adjustments at budget time.”
Research has shown that the kind of budgetary priorities expressed in
Mayor Gwaltney’s memo do impact officers’ behavior, but that impact
does not necessarily overpower any racial biases or preferences that may
be driving officers’ behavior. For example, Makowsky and Stratmann
(2009) use MA traffic citation data to find that officers’ budget-maximizing
behaviors are shaped by political considerations as well as preferences
regarding race and gender. Even critics of the evidence of racial bias in
revenue-focused policing acknowledge the pressure on local institutions
to focus enforcement on those perceived as “outsiders” (Heriot 2017).
Most recently, Goldstein, Sances, and You (2018) analyze data from
over 5,000 local governments and find that municipalities relying on
fines and fees as a greater share of revenue have lower violent and property
crime clearance rates, as police departments’ energies are directed toward
revenue-generating activities. Rather than competing motivations of social
control versus revenue maximization, revenue generation and race-based
policing seem to exist in an equipoise.
The use of arrest- or ticketing-generated revenues to offset budget shortfalls is hardly confined to MO (Sobol 2016). For example, Garrett and
Wagner (2009) find that police in NC issued more tickets after local
revenue shortfalls, and Rowe (2010) finds that discrimination against
out-of-town drivers in traffic enforcement by police in MA is motivated
by revenue shortfalls. Baicker and Jacobson (2007) show that laws permitting police seizures of money incentivized police to increase drug arrest
activities, leading to a tug-of-war between police and local public
finance authorities. Surveying this literature, the Council of Economic
Advisers (2015) concluded that “[i]ncreases in criminal justice spending
have put a strain on local criminal justice budgets and led to the
broader use of fine[s], penalties, and itemized criminal justice fees in
an effort to support budgets.”
We seek to identify the types of drivers officers target when given
increased incentives to bring in revenue. If baseline traffic stop, citation,
and arrest rates are disparate across drivers’ racial identities, a change in officers’ incentive structure could result in shifts in those disparities. For
example, Gordon and Huber (2007) show that when trial judges are up
for election, they issue harsher criminal sentences, and Berdejo and
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Yuchtman (2013) show that criminal sentences are 10% longer as judges
approach the end of their electoral cycle. Park (2017) finds that this
electoral-pressure effect is disproportionately focused among Black defendants. Relatedly, Kubik and Moran (2003) find that states are approximately
25% more likely to conduct executions in gubernatorial election years
than in other years, and that there is a larger effect on the probability
that a Black defendant will be executed than on the probability that a
White defendant will be executed. Recent work shows that these electoral
cycles may not be widespread, being most pronounced in the small set of
states from which data for previous studies were collected (Dippel and
Poyker 2019). However, Dippel and Poyker (2019) also find that electoral
cycles may be most likely in states with high levels of electoral competition
among judges.
This paper aims to identify how institutional enforcement incentives
affect racial disparities in police traffic stops. The Ferguson Report
(2015) found evidence of fiscal enforcement motives within the courts,
city government, and the police, in particular; the interaction of these
fiscal motives with traffic officers’ decision making may provide additional
insights about the structure of discriminatory policing. If police are responsive to fiscal pressures and aware that shifting resources away from racially
discriminatory stops may result in higher revenue, we might expect to see a
shift of officers’ attention away from Black and Latino drivers and toward
White drivers, who may be relatively more able to pay the related fines.
In other words, during times of municipal fiscal distress, officers might prioritize the incentive to bring in revenue (that could be directed toward
their department and their own salaries) over baseline preferences for discriminatory policing, or at least attempt to balance the two.
One possibility is that the political economy of local policing makes it
more costly for law enforcement to impose the latent taxation of consistent
traffic citations on higher income motorists who may have more political
influence; to the extent that officers use race as a proxy for this influence,
they may target non-White drivers for consistent enforcement. Even if less
well-off Black and Latino drivers have less ability to pay on average, targeting them consistently may maximize long-run revenues if their relative
lack of political power and resources (compared to Whites) prevents
them from effectively challenging discriminatory enforcement. Higher
income, disproportionately White, motorists may serve as a ready source
of additional revenue in the short run, specifically in times of fiscal distress. Although the individual racial preferences of officers are likely to
impact enforcement discrepancies (Donohue and Levitt 2001), as are
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the institutional decisions within each police department, revenuemaximizing policing may also be guided by the different revenue elasticities of enforcement that local officials expect to encounter among groups
with varying political power (Makowsky, Stratmann, and Tabarrok 2018).

DATA
The paper merges two main datasets for the analysis. The first is the local
government finances data for MO, from which we construct a measure of
budget distress. The second is the agency-level traffic stops data, used to
construct measures of traffic enforcement effort across racial groups.
There are 769 agencies in the dataset, for which we have 13 years of
annual panel data from 2000 through 2012. We also include a variety
of municipal- and county-level census demographic measures.
The data on local government financial accounts come from the
IndFin local government finances census dataset. The accounts data
include items on revenues, expenditures, assets, and liabilities. The data
are matched to municipal governments (police departments) and county
governments (sheriff’s departments).
IndFin is a survey of all local governments administered every 5 years; if
the localities do not provide previous years’ data, those values are imputed
by the Bureau of Census statisticians. This induces measurement error but
should not bias the estimates away from zero in either direction. There are
some missing data in the census, which we partly filled in using annual
financials directly from the state of MO.
Our preferred measure of local fiscal distress is based on Garrett and
Wagner (2009). We have the log government revenue for agency i at
year t, Git. In the regression models that follow, our measure of Fiscal
Distress at year t is the proportional change in log revenue for the previous
year, ΔGit1. This is meant to summarize the idea that there is a revenue
problem that is realized at the end of the year, which the government may
try to make up for the next year through increased ticketing. The reason
for using revenues, without including expenditures, is that they are not
as easily changed by local government, and therefore an exogenous
“end of year” effect on policing decisions is more plausible. Still, we
have tried using expenditures minus revenues as an alternative measure
for fiscal distress, and our main results are the same.3
In addition, we include a RD specification where we look at discrete
changes in policing around the threshold of a negative budget change.
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For the RD specification, the variable Budget Shortfall is defined as
ΔGit1 < 0; that is, it equals one if revenue collections went down last
year. We tried an “in-the-red” specification where treatment is years
where expenditures were higher than revenues, but we found no effects
in that specification.
The data on traffic stops come from the MO Attorney General’s Racial
Profiling database. This is an annual survey of policing agencies that
includes a distribution across race and ethnicity for all traffic policing
actions. MO has been collecting statewide incident-level data on police
traffic stops since 2001. The form that agencies have to fill out for every
traffic stop is included in the Appendix. We have access to aggregate data,
by agency and the race/ethnicity of the person stopped, for the years 2001
through 2013, and use the years 2001 through 2012. Hernández-Murillo
and Knowles (2004), Rojek, Rosenfeld, and Decker (2004), and
Rosenfeld, Rojek, and Decker (2011) all have used these data to analyze
aggregate racial disparities in traffic stops at different points in time.
The merged traffic stop and finance data include over 700 of MO’s
counties and cities, while smaller municipalities, such as villages, are
not included. We do not include these smaller municipalities, because
they are difficult to merge with finance data (they may be less likely to
respond to the IndFin survey, municipality names were less consistent
for these locations, and some municipalities cross county borders).
However, these smaller municipalities have far fewer traffic stops than
those included in the dataset, and they also typically have populations
that are less diverse, racially. The local finance data are available for
most of the sheriffs and police departments in the dataset for the years
2002, 2007, and 2012 when the IndFin survey was conducted, with
more departments responding in 2007 and 2012 than in 2002. In
non-survey years, we have finance data for 196 departments, including
69 sheriff’s departments and 127 police departments.4
The main variable of interest from IndFin is log revenue changes. We
use the log revenue change for the previous year as a sign of fiscal health.
The distribution of this variable is included in the Appendix. We do not
see any sign of manipulation of revenues around the zero cutoff.
Finally, we collected and merged in a range of demographic variables
from the American Community Survey (ACS), matchable to county or
municipality. We use the ACS 3-year estimates that span the time
period included in this study. These variables include the 2000 ( pre-analysis) values for log population, proportion white-race residents, proportion urban vs rural, and proportion aged over 65. We use these as

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Columbia University - Law Library, on 26 Aug 2020 at 22:16:07, subject to the Cambridge
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/rep.2020.10

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3192562

Fiscal Pressures and Discriminatory Policing

11

controls, interacted with year, and we also use them in heterogeneity
analyses, included below.
We focus on four outcome variables constructed from the racial profiling data. First, we compute the citation rate, which is the number of citations issued by agency i to drivers of race r during year t, divided by the
number of total traffic stops by agency i of drivers of race r during year
t. Similarly, the search rate is the number of searches divided by the
number of stops. The hit rate is the number of contraband discoveries
divided by the number of searches. The arrest rate is the number of
arrests divided by the number of stops. Summary statistics for these measures, by race, are reported in Table 1. We also report the stops per person,
where the numerator is total stops for a racial/ethnic group and the denominator is the local population identifying with that racial/ethnic group from
the 2000 and 2010 censuses, with the intervening years interpolated.
There are few differences by race or ethnicity in the citation rates.
However, search and arrest rates are significantly higher for Black and
Latino motorists. The patterns in search and arrest rates are in line with
those found nationwide; Black and Latino drivers are searched more frequently than White drivers and Latino drivers experience even higher
search rates than Blacks (Pierson et al. 2017). The hit rate is highest for
Whites, suggesting preferential treatment for Whites in searches on
average (e.g. Hernández-Murillo and Knowles 2004). Finally, there are
big differences in stops per person, with Blacks having an especially
high number of stops per person on average.
To assess the statistical significance of these baseline differences, we estimate the following multivariate regression:
0
Yirt ¼ ait þ g0 Blackirt þ g1 Hispanicirt þ Xirt
bit þ 1irt ,

ð1Þ

where αit is an agency-year fixed effect, Blackirt is a dummy variable equaling one for Black drivers, and Hispanicirt is a dummy variable equaling
one for Latino drivers. We run this regression for Black, Latino, and
White drivers, so γ0 and γ1 give the average differences of Blacks and
Latinos from Whites, after residualizing out the fixed effects and controls.
We have access to a range of covariates, represented in Xirt, which again
are aggregated by race. For driver demographics, we have age ( proportion
of drivers in bins 18–29, 30–39, and 40+) and gender ( proportion male).
We have the location (city-street, county road, interstate, state highway, U.
S. highway) of the stop, reason for the stop (e.g. moving violation), and the
authority given for a search (consent, drug/alcohol odor, drug dog alert,
incident to arrest, inventory, plain view, or reasonable suspicion). We

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Columbia University - Law Library, on 26 Aug 2020 at 22:16:07, subject to the Cambridge
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/rep.2020.10

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3192562

12

Summary Statistics on Stop Outcomes by Race
Rates

Counts (by Agency-Year)
Race

Stops

Citations

Searches

Hits

Arrests

Stops per
Person

Citation

Search

Hit

Arrest

Asian

Mean
S.D.

33.732
144.842

20.67
99.041

1.074
5.402

.163
.875

.744
3.219

1.73
9.3

.4778
.4051

.0414
.1309

.1625
.3255

.0299
.1115

Black

Mean
S.D.

450.598
2,760.000

295.789
1,780.000

51.634
321.317

9.092
56.630

38.642
237.992

3.82
18.6

.4649
.3275

.1105
.1434

.2236
.2963

.0826
.1325

Latino

Mean
S.D.

60.874
394.418

38.622
285.101

7.977
41.714

1.170
6.478

5.675
29.628

1.26
14.5

.4984
.3493

.1361
.1886

.1686
.2753

.0960
.1637

White

Mean
S.D.

1,920.000
12,600.000

1,090.000
7,970.000

124.945
629.777

28.843
159.255

86.646
469.428

.4636
.2733

.0797
.0829

.2790
.2287

.0543
.0723

Other

Mean
S.D.

30.728
141.959

17.716
99.115

1.430
6.247

.257
1.186

.883
3.714

.4740
.3849

.0623
.1600

.19780
.3399

.0427
.1355

.465
3.12
2.24
33.5
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also include the reason for arrest—drug violation, driving while intoxicated, assault, outstanding warrant, property crime, resisting arrest, and
traffic violation.
The results from estimating Equation (1) are reported in Table 2. The
first striking thing is that Blacks have many more stops relative to their share
of the population (columns 1 and 2) than members of other racial/ethnic
groups. This much higher stop rate likely explains the, perhaps surprising,
result that Black drivers tend to have a lower citation rate than White drivers
(columns 3 and 4); many more Black drivers are stopped, including many
who do not deserve a ticket. Meanwhile, Latino drivers are cited at a significantly higher rate. Both Blacks and Latinos are searched at a higher
rate, with lower contraband hit rates, than Whites. Both Blacks and
Latinos are arrested at higher rates than Whites. In particular, the lower
rate of productive searches for Blacks and Latinos (columns 7 and 8) suggests that police are more careful and selective in searching White motorists compared to non-White drivers (e.g. Hernández-Murillo and
Knowles 2004).
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
This section describes the approach for analyzing the relationship between
local budget stress and discriminatory policing. The research design is
based on that employed by Garrett and Wagner (2009), who found,
using data from 1990 through 2003, that NC municipalities with negative
budget shocks responded by issuing more traffic tickets. The main goal,
here, is to measure the disparate racial impacts of budget response by
policing agencies.
We estimate the racial disparity in the change in enforcement outcome
Yirt (e.g. the citation rate) for agency i, race r, and year t using
X
0
DYirt ¼ air þ art þ
rs Rr¼s Dit þ Xirt
b þ 1irt
ð2Þ
s

where αir is an agency-race interacted fixed effect, αrt is a race-year interacted fixed effect, and is an error term. The treatment variable Dit is a
measure for fiscal distress, defined as the negative change in revenue for
the previous year in jurisdiction i. This measure, called Fiscal Distress
in the tables below, is based on Garrett and Wagner (2009). The term
Rr=s is a dummy variable for the race of the driver, and the term ρs
gives the impact of lagged fiscal distress on race s [ {White, Black,
Hispanic}. Therefore, the summation expression in (2) gives three
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Racial Differences in Stop Outcomes: Regression Estimates
(1)
(2)
Stops per Person

(3)
(4)
Citation Rate

(5)
(6)
Search Rate

(7)

(8)
Hit Rate

(9)
(10)
Arrest Rate

Black Driver

3.595**
(.759)

3.720**
(.827)

−.00700+
(.00359)

−.0101**
(.00376)

.0296**
(.00207)

.00294**
(.000886)

−.0343**
(.00471)

−.0312**
(.00582)

.0274**
(.00187)

.00908**
(.00135)

Latino Driver

.432
(.595)

.789
(.815)

.0238**
(.00498)

.0211**
(.00583)

.0549**
(.00284)

.00576**
(.00116)

−.0894**
(.00469)

−.0943**
(.00897)

.0400**
(.00265)

.0186**
(.00201)

X

X
X
X

X

X
X
X

X

X
X
X
X

X

X
X
X
X

X

X
X
X

Agency-Year FE’s
Demographics
Stop Reasons
Search Reasons
Arrest Reasons
N
R2

X
10,249
.120

10,249
.118

21,777
.612

21,777
.623

21,802
.274

21,802
.880

14,216
.240

14,216
.282

18,591
.300

18,591
.696

Notes: Observation is an agency-race-year, where Whites, Blacks, and Latinos are included. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by agency. +p < .10, *p < .05,
**p < .01.
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effects: of fiscal distress on the outcome, separately for each of the three
driver races. If local governments in budgetary distress seek to impose a
larger share of taxes on members of a racial group, that would be consistent with ^rr . 0.
We cluster standard errors by policing agency to allow for serial correlation across time in the agencies. The identification assumption for
unbiased OLS estimates of ρ is that Dit is uncorrelated with other unobserved factors affecting the rates of change in the outcome in period t, conditional on the fixed effects. This may be a strong assumption if last year’s
budget conditions influence other socioeconomic and/or political factors
this year that in turn affect traffic ticketing. An example of this type of factor
would be decreases in expenditures on traffic lights and road signs, which
may reduce ticketing. We assess the identification assumption by testing
different specifications and adding controls. In addition, we include a
RD specification where we look at discrete changes in policing around
the budget shortfall threshold. For the RD design, the variable Budget
Shortfall is a dummy variable equaling one when revenue collections
decreased last year.5
RESULTS
This section reports results from a number of analyses. First, we consider a
range of outcomes discussed in section “Data”. We then provide regression
estimates for ρ and ρr in Equation (2) from section “Empirical Strategy”.
We report a number of specification checks, and, then, consider heterogeneous effects based on the characteristics of the jurisdictions.
Main Results
The first regression estimates are reported in Table 3. We look at four outcomes: citation rate, search rate, hit rate, and arrest rate, defined in section
“Data”. The tables include our baseline specifications (with agency-race
and race-year fixed effects) in columns 1, 3, 5, and 7. The other
columns (2, 4, 6, 8) include a number of stop-related covariates for the
demographics of drivers arrested, and the reasons for stops, searches, and
arrests, which may be correlated with driver race and subsequent outcomes. The rows give the interacted effects for White, Black, and
Latino drivers, respectively. The sample includes White, Black, and
Latino drivers.
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Effect of Fiscal Distress on Enforcement Rates
(1)
(2)
Δ Citation Rate

Fiscal Distress
×White Driver
Fiscal Distress
×Black Driver
Fiscal Distress
×Latino Driver
Agency-Race FE’s
Race-Year FE’s
Demographics
Stop Reasons
Search Reasons
Arrest Reasons
N
R2

(3)
(4)
Δ Search Rate

(5)

Δ Hit Rate

(6)

(7)
(8)
Δ Arrest Rate

.0481*
(.0195)

.0259+
(.0136)

.0027
(.0104)

.00239
(.0311)

−.0076
(.0321)

−.0145
(.0323)

−.00693
(.0328)

−.0171
(.0301)

−.0170
(.0283)

.0131
(.0616)

.00794
(.0578)

−.0342
(.0385)

−.0175
(.0261)

.00350
(.0396)

−.00405
(.0410)

.0841+
(.0475)

.0555+
(.0283)

.0199
(.0590)

.0267
(.0566)

.0717*
(.0360)

.0368
(.0249)

X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X

.0548**
(.0207)

.0347**
(.0121)

.0214*
(.0096)

X
3,361
.115

3,361
.193

3,363
.067

3,363
.505

2,978
.103

2,978
.154

2,612
.088

2,612
.497

Notes: Observation is an agency-race-year, where Whites, Blacks, and Latinos are included. Fiscal Distress is defined as the log negative revenue change. ×Black
Driver and ×Latino Driver indicate the interaction between Fiscal Distress and dummy variables for the respective driver race. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by agency. +p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01.
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We find, first, that a decrease in government revenue growth the previous year is associated with a higher citation rate for White drivers (columns
1 and 2). The estimates are not statistically significant for Latino drivers or
for Black drivers. There is a statistically significant increase in the arrest rate
for White drivers as well, but not for Black or Latino drivers. Finally, a
decrease in government revenue growth does not have much effect on
the search rate or hit rate. However, there is a marginally significant positive relationship with the search rate for Latino drivers.
Next, in Table 4, we further probe the results for citation rates. First, we
present results from separate models for each racial group. We see that
there is a positive relationship between fiscal distress and citation rate for
White drivers (column 1), but not for Black (column 2) or Latino
(column 3) drivers. The results for Whites alone (column 4) are robust
to adding a set of pre-treatment census demographic controls (total population, percent White, percent urban, and percent over 65), interacted
with a full set of indicators for each year in our data. The estimates with
all three races included are not significant (column 5). An alternative specification (column 6) including White drivers in the baseline, and Blacks/
Latinos interacted, shows that the interactions, while negative, are noisy
and not statistically different from White drivers.
Table 5 includes similar robustness checks for arrest rates. Again, we see
a positive relationship between fiscal distress and arrest rates for Whites,
but not for Black or Latino drivers. These coefficients are robust to the
full set of census covariates interacted with each year in the data.
Overall, these results support the view that in response to budget stress,
MO police are arresting White drivers more often. One interpretation of
this evidence is that officers expect that arrests of White drivers would generate more revenue through the legal financial obligations that stem from
an arrest.
In Table 6, we look at the change in counts, rather than rates, to see
what components of our variables are changing in response to the
budget distress. First, we check whether these results are driven by
changes in total stops (versus changes in total citations, e.g.). We can
see from columns (1) and (2) that the results are not driven by changes
in total stops, which remain unchanged during times of fiscal distress.
These estimates are also zero if looking at stops per person, dividing by
the local race population. The coefficients for White drivers on number
of citations, searches, search hits, and arrests are all positive, but significant
only for arrests. While it is only significant at the 10% level, there is a
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Robustness: Effect of Fiscal Distress on Citation Rates

Fiscal Distress
(Baseline)

(1)

(2)

.0471*
(.0207)

−.0141
(.0347)

(3)
(4)
Effect on Δ Log Citation Rate
−.00864
(.0421)

.0492*
(.0211)

(5)

(6)

.0122
(.0224)

.0510*
(.0197)

Fiscal Distress
×Black Driver

−.0620
(.0378)

Fiscal Distress
×Latino Driver

−.0603
(.0447)

Sample
Agency-Race FE’s
Race-Year FE’s
Demographics
Stop Reasons
Census×Year FE’s
N
R2

Whites

Blacks

Latinos

Whites

All

All

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

1,190
.189

1,109
.251

1,062
.190

1,159
.216

3,293
.227

3,293
.228

Census×Year FE’s means pre-2001 local demographics ( population, % white, % urban, and % over 65) interacted with year fixed effects.
Notes: Observation is an agency-race-year, where Whites, Blacks, and Latinos are included. Fiscal Distress is defined as the log negative revenue change. ×Black
Driver and ×Latino Driver indicate the interaction between Fiscal Distress and dummy variables for the respective driver race. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by agency. +p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01.
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Fiscal Distress
(Baseline)

(1)

(2)

.0223*
(.00862)

−.00873
(.0212)

(3)
(4)
Effect on Δ Log Arrest Rate
.0311
(.0230)

.0215*
(.00890)

(5)

(6)

.0127
(.0133)

.0214*
(.00975)

Fiscal Distress
×Black Driver

−.0409
(.0278)

Fiscal Distress
×Latino Driver

.0132
(.0279)

Sample
Agency-Year FE’s
Race-Year FE’s
Demographics
Stop Reasons
Census×Year FE’s
N
R2

Whites

Blacks

Latinos

Whites

All

All

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

854
.569

837
.517

2,559
.519

2,559
.520

921
.579

895
.518
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19

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Columbia University - Law Library, on 26 Aug 2020 at 22:16:07, subject to the Cambridge
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/rep.2020.10

Table 5.

20

Effect of Fiscal Distress on Enforcement Counts
(1)
(2)
Δ Log Total Stops

(3)
(4)
Δ Log Citations

Fiscal Distress
×White Driver

−.0674
(.102)

−.0845
(.102)

.143
(.124)

.127
(.123)

.214
(.160)

.0963
(.141)

.129
(.153)

.0697
(.153)

Fiscal Distress
×Black Driver

−.208
(.157)

−.214
(.144)

−.238+
(.128)

−.237+
(.131)

−.0941
(.167)

−.158
(.156)

−.139
(.168)

Fiscal Distress
×Latino Driver

−.0253
(.151)

−.0584
(.153)

.0285
(.156)

−.0318
(.160)

.281
(.202)

.0754
(.183)

X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X

Agency-Race FE’s
Race-Year FE’s
Demographics
Stop Reasons
Search Reasons
Arrest Reasons
N
R2

(5)
(6)
Δ Log Searches

(7)
(8)
Δ Log Search Hits

(9)
(10)
Δ Log Arrests
.521**
(.162)

.429**
(.149)

−.221
(.160)

.163
(.166)

.267+
(.160)

.180
(.161)

.0682
(.156)

.393+
(.228)

.231
(.214)

X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X

3,350
.114

3,350
.139

3,328
.121

3,328
.144

3,329
.092

3,317
.255

3,313
.089

3,308
.154

2,612
.108

2,609
.271

Notes: Observation is an agency-race-year, where Whites, Blacks, and Latinos are included. Fiscal Distress is defined as the log negative revenue change. ×Black
Driver and ×Latino Driver indicate the interaction between Fiscal Distress and dummy variables for the respective driver race. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by agency. +p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01.
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statistical decrease in the number of citations given to Black drivers, consistent with re-allocation across races.
Overall, the results of the analysis of counts substantiate the main
finding that fiscal distress changes the number of citations assigned to
and number of arrests of White drivers. There is no effect on the
number of traffic stops for White drivers or non-White drivers, meaning
that officers are not replacing stops of Black drivers with stops of White
drivers. Rather they appear to be treating the same set of White drivers
they normally stop more harshly. For Black drivers, the fact that stops are
not increasing means that a decrease in citations and searches cannot
be interpreted as an expansion in the sample of stopped drivers to a marginal set (drivers with relatively lower criminality). Instead, police seem to
be re-allocating time away from the same set of drivers.
We report visual evidence of the relationship for citation rates in
Figure 1, showing the RD jump for White, Black, and Latino drivers.
The dependent variable, lagged change in log revenues, is on the
x-axis. We mark the cut-off point at zero, with positive budget changes
to the right and negative budget changes to the left. We can see a discrete
change in citation activity at the zero revenue change cutoff. Just below
the cutoff (a bare budget shortfall ), we see a jump in citation rates for
White drivers (left panel ). For Black drivers, there are slightly fewer citations below the cutoff (middle panel ). For Latino drivers, there is no difference (right panel ). When there is a revenue shortfall, police in the
subsequent year tend to target White drivers with traffic citations.
The regression results for this specification are in Table 7. First, we see
in columns 1 and 2 that the main result for citation rates holds for an alternative definition for budget stress: a dummy variable equaling one if revenues decreased in the previous year. The table shows that if revenues
decreased, the citation rate increases for White drivers but not for Black
or Latino drivers. The effect of the dummy-variable treatment is robust
to including the standard fiscal distress variable (lagged negative revenue
change) as a control (columns 3–4). Here, the coefficient for the fiscal distress variable is not statistically significant, meaning that the citation rate
change is driven by the discrete budget-shortfall effect. For arrests, we
see the opposite. There is no discrete jump in enforcement at the revenuenegative cutoff. Instead, it is driven by the continuous Fiscal Distress variable (columns 7–8). The RD specification points to a causal relationship
between budget shortfalls and racial differences in traffic citations.
Our main results on traffic citations are summarized graphically in
Figure 2. The coefficient plots give the parameter estimates and
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FIGURE 1. Regression Discontinuity: Effect of Negative Revenue Change on
Citation Rates by Race. RD visualization for effect of the lagged local revenue
change (horizontal axis) on change in log citation rates (vertical axis),
separately by driver race/ethnicity. Graphs produced by “cmogram” package in
Stata with lfitci option.

confidence intervals for the specifications in Table 3 column 2 (top panel,
continuous treatment) and Table 7 column 2 (bottom panel, discrete treatment). The plots illustrate quite clearly how the effect of fiscal pressure on
traffic citation behavior varies by the race of the stopped driver.

Heterogeneous Results
Table 8 considers the importance of the White–Black income ratio.
Officers may increase citations and arrests of White drivers in response
to fiscal distress because they expect that White drivers will have higher
incomes than Black or Latino drivers and, therefore, be better able to
pay the related fees, which will be used to address budgetary shortfalls.
If this is the case, we should expect fiscal distress to lead to tougher treatment of stopped White drivers in areas where the income inequality
between Whites and Blacks is highest. To test this, we split the sample
by the White–Black income ratio. A high ratio represents greater
income inequality between Whites and Blacks.
For White drivers, we see that, across specifications, there is generally a
positive, significant relationship between budget shortfalls and fiscal distress and citation rates. However, the relationship with the continuous
measure is not significant under a low White–Black ratio (column 1).
In addition, the negative relationship between the discreet measure and
citation rates for Black drivers is larger in magnitude, more precisely estimated, and statistically significant only for areas with above-median
White–Black income inequality (see column 4). This result supports a
model where officers are more likely to target White drivers in times of
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RD Specification: Revenue Reductions versus Budget Shortfall
(1)

Sample
Budget Shortfall
×White Driver

(2)
(3)
Δ Citation Rate

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)
Δ Arrest Rate

Whites

All

Whites

All

Whites

All

Whites

All

.0199**
(.00704)

.0196**
(.00673)

.0167+
(.00901)

.0160+
(.00887)

.00298
(.00466)

.00388
(.00477)

−.00572
(.00515)

−.00559
(.00531)

Budget Shortfall
×Black Driver

−.00555
(.0103)

−.00473
(.0132)

−.0149
(.0119)

Budget Shortfall
×Latino Driver

.00346
(.0113)

.00418
(.0164)

.0161
(.0106)

Fiscal Distress
×White Driver

.0162
(.0268)

.0186
(.0272)

(8)

−.0155
(.0129)
.000385
(.0138)
.0439**
(.0138)

.0476**
(.0143)

Fiscal Distress
×Black Driver

−.00428
(.0406)

.00271
(.0400)

Fiscal Distress
×Latino Driver

−.00369
(.0637)

.0803
(.0549)

Agency-Race FE’s
Race-Year FE’s
Demographics
Census×Year FE’s
N
R2

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

1,159
.146

3,293
.177

1,159
.146

3,293
.177

X
X
X
X
895
.113

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

2,559
.122

895
.120

2,559
.125

23

Census×Year FE’s means pre-2001 local demographics ( population, % white, % urban, and % over 65) interacted with year fixed effects.
Notes: Observation is an agency-race-year, where Whites, Blacks, and Latinos are included. Budget Shortfall is defined as an indicator equaling one if revenue
changes were negative last year. Fiscal Distress is defined as the log negative revenue change. ×Black Driver and ×Latino Driver indicate the interaction
between the indicate revenue variable and the respective driver race. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by agency. +p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01.
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FIGURE 2. Coefficient Plots: Main Results for Citation Rates by Race.
Coefficient plots for main regression results. Specifications are from Table 3
column 2 (top panel, Fiscal Distress continuous treatment), and Table 7
column 2 (bottom panel, Budget Shortfall discrete treatment). Outcome is log
change in citation rate. Regression includes agency-race FE’s, race-year FE’s,
driver demographics, and stop reasons.

fiscal distress when they have a higher expectation of White drivers’ ability
to pay.
For arrests, we see an increase for White drivers only when there is a
high White–Black income ratio (columns 7–8). The interactions with
Black driver are not significant, which could be more evidence that
when Whites have higher incomes, police target them more frequently
for arrest in order to generate legal financial obligations. Given constraints
on the total number of traffic stops that can be made, police agencies
under fiscal distress re-allocate citations and arrests to these higher-income
drivers.
Finally, Table 9 presents the results from our second heterogeneity analysis on Black driver stop intensity. For this analysis, we explore the possibility that our results are driven by a selection effect of marginal drivers
across races. At baseline, there could be significant over-policing of
Black drivers, and the marginal driver is not committing any citable
offenses. Therefore, the marginal value of stopping more Black drivers
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Heterogeneity by White–Black Income Ratio
(1)

(2)
(3)
Δ Citation Rate

(4)

(5)

(6)
(7)
Δ Arrest Rate

Fiscal Distress
×White Driver

.0597
(.0365)

.0582*
(.0265)

−.000893
(.0257)

.0526**
(.0198)

Fiscal Distress
×Black Driver

.00353
(.0510)

−.0439
(.0524)

−.0211
(.0333)

−.0641
(.0842)

Budget Shortfall
×White Driver

.0236*
(.0114)

Budget Shortfall
×Black Driver

−.0160
(.0191)

.0132+
(.00774)
−.0333*
(.0165)

Sample

Low W-B Ratio

High W-B Ratio

Agency-Race FE’s
Race-Year FE’s
Demographics
Stop Reasons
Arrest Reasons
Census×Year FE’s

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

N
R2

X
X
X
X
X

1,043
.254

1,043
.257

X
X
X
X
X

1,206
.264

1,206
.265

−.00637
(.00803)

.0106+
(.00535)

−.000391
(.0118)

−.0301
(.0253)

Low W-B Ratio
X
X
X
X
X

824
.216

(8)

X
X
X
X
X
X
824
.217
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High W-B Ratio
X
X
X
X
X

911
.130

X
X
X
X
X
X
911
.130

Census×Year FE’s means pre-2001 local demographics ( population, % white, % urban, and % over 65) interacted with year fixed effects.
Notes: Observation is an agency-race-year, where Whites and Blacks are included. Fiscal Distress is defined as the log negative revenue change. Budget Shortfall is
defined as an indicator equaling one if revenue changes were negative last year. ×Black Driver and ×Latino Driver indicate the interaction between the indicate
revenue variable and the respective driver race. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by agency. +p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01.
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(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)
Δ Arrest Rate

(8)

Fiscal Distress
×White Driver

.0599+
(.0342)

.0675+
(.0376)

.00714
(.0272)

.0449**
(.0142)

Fiscal Distress
×Black Driver

−.0683
(.0733)

.0324
(.0455)

−.100
(.0913)

.0163
(.0336)

Budget Shortfall
×White Driver

.0137
(.0109)

.0203*
(.00943)

−.00508
(.00958)

.00810*
(.00383)

Budget Shortfall
×Black Driver

−.0300
(.0222)

.00637
(.0112)

−.0389
(.0291)

.00297
(.00836)

Sample

Low Black Stops

High Black Stops

Agency-Race FE’s
Race-Year FE’s
Demographics
Stop Reasons
Arrest Reasons
Census×Year FE’s

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

N
R2

X
X
X
X
X

1,116
.323

1,116
.325

X
X
X
X

Low Black Stops
X
X
X
X
X

X
1,002
.406

1,002
.407

815
.241

X
X
X
X
X
X
815
.247

High Black Stops
X
X
X
X
X

821
.391

X
X
X
X
X
X
821
.388

Census×Year FE’s means pre-2001 local demographics ( population, % white, % urban, and % over 65) interacted with year fixed effects.
Notes: Observation is an agency-race-year, where Whites and Blacks are included. Fiscal Distress is defined as the log negative revenue change. Budget Shortfall is
defined as an indicator equaling one if revenue changes were negative last year. ×Black Driver and ×Latino Driver indicate the interaction between the indicate
revenue variable and the respective driver race. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by agency. +p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01.
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would be low even under significant fiscal pressure. In contrast, if White
drivers are not being over-policed, the marginal White driver could more
likely be ticketed to raise more revenues.
To look for evidence of this possibility, we produced estimates of the citation and arrest effects, separately by whether the locality is above or below
the median of Black driver stop intensity—defined as the number of stops
of Black drivers in the previous year, divided by the pre-treatment Black
population ( year 2000). There is not a difference in the relationship
between budgetary concerns and citation rates by Black stop intensity
for the continuous measure (columns 1, 3). But we do see a difference
for the continuous measure on arrests, and for the discrete measure on
citations as well as arrests. Comparing columns 2–4, we see that there is
a positive and statistically significant effect on citation rates for White
drivers only for areas with a higher previous Black stop intensity.
Similarly, comparing columns 5–7 and 6–8, there is a fiscal-pressure
effect on arrest rates only in areas with a high Black stop intensity.
These results are consistent with an important difference in the revenue
potential of the marginal stopped driver, reflecting historical over-policing
of Blacks in the United States.

CONCLUSION
The broad contribution of this project is the exploration of how local governments create incentives for law enforcement that contribute to the
structure of discriminatory policing. While there is evidence of the relationship between local budget policies and police law enforcement practices, and a separate literature of racial discrimination in policing, this
paper is the first to shed light on the interaction of these processes. We
find that in response to budget distress, there is greater enforcement activity
(ticketing and arrests) for White drivers, but not for non-White drivers.
This result offers a different view of discriminatory enforcement than
Park (2017), where judges responded to stronger enforcement incentives
to administer punishment with greater discrimination: Blacks were more
likely to pay a racial punishment tax under pressure-incentive conditions
than were Whites (see Kennedy 1998).
There could be many mechanisms underlying the relationship uncovered here. One simple explanation for the marginal change in enforcement behavior is that police are aware of White drivers’ greater ability to
pay traffic tickets. When higher short-run revenue is necessary, officers
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shift their limited resources of time to increased targeting of White drivers.
Consistent with this idea, we find that the racial differences in enforcement effects are highest in areas where there is a large White-to-Black
income ratio. On the other hand, we also have evidence that MO
police focus enforcement efforts on Blacks and Latinos in the absence
of fiscal distress, despite lower hit rates among these motorists than
White drivers and the fact that officers behave consistently with a belief
that citations to White drivers generate more revenue. This historical overpolicing partly explains our results on fiscal pressures; in areas with historical over-policing of Black drivers, we see a larger re-allocation of tickets
from Black to White drivers. An interpretation is that in areas with high
Black driver stop intensity, Blacks are already being stopped and cited as
much as possible, so the marginal driver is unlikely to produce more
revenue.
Future work can shed further light on the factors contributing to the
relationship between racial preferences and revenue incentives.
Understanding how budget factors affect police discrimination, both in
response to short-run fiscal shocks and in the aggregate, may suggest institutional solutions for reducing discrimination. Fiscally pressured enforcement patterns may be valuable evidence of how officers behave in
conditions where the incentive to produce race-neutral policing tempers
the motivation for racially discriminatory policing. These results raise
important questions about the ways tensions in generating fine and fee
revenue from poor communities of color may be undergirded by political
economy considerations. The broader social consequences of these processes are also uncertain. For example, future work may explore whether
racially disparate budget effects have a subsequent impact on crime.
The findings presented here highlight the complex relationship between
local budgets, policing, and race, as well as much that remains to be
studied.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

The supplementary material for this article can be found at https://doi.org/10.1017/rep.2020.10.
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NOTES
1 Shoub et al. (2020) consider the importance of institutional motivations for shifts in officer
behavior as well, finding that Black drivers are less likely to face discretionary police searches when
there is a Black chief of police.
2 John Eligon, “Stopped, Ticketed, Fined: The Pitfalls of Driving While Black in Ferguson,” NY
Times, 6 August 2019.
3 Alternatively, results are also robust to including log expenditures as a control.
4 As mentioned, we obtained annual data for most localities directly from the state of MO. Our
main results were similar using data from the state rather than IndFin. With the state data, the RD specification generated larger and more significant effects. The effects with the continuous treatment were
less robust.
5 Our results are not robust to using the level of the outcome rather than the first-differenced
outcome. But they are robust to using a lagged-outcome-variable design, where we run the regression
in levels but include the lagged outcome variable as a regressor without fixed effects.
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